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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAMELA CHAFFINf 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALBERTSONS, INC. 
Defendant and Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Issues on Appeal 
A. Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of 
law that Chaffin failed to satisfy her burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact that remains for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
B. Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of 
law that Chaffin failed to satisfy her burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable inference could be made 
by a jury that Albertsons created the condition which allegedly 
caused Chaffin's fall. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Lindsay v. Eccles 
Hotel Co.. 248 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 
District Court No. 910907736 PI 
Court of Appeals No. 930619-CA 
Priority No. 15 
P.2d 566 (Utah 1967); Silcox v. Skacrcrs-Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 
623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
C. Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of 
law that Chaffin failed to satisfy her burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence that Albertsons had actual or constructive 
notice of the condition allegedly causing Chaffin1s fall and a 
reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition after having notice. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 
1139 (Utah 1977). 
II. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Ruling 
The appellate court reviews for correctness the legal 
conclusions of the trial court. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 
(Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b)(c) and (e) , attached in 
addendum as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case arose as the result of an alleged slip and fall of 
Chaffin inside a grocery store operated by Albertsons on the 
morning of January 3, 1991 at 7:05 a.m. (R. 2-5). The subject 
grocery store is located in Taylorsville, Utah, at 1825 West 4700 
South. (Id.) 
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II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
Chaffin filed her Complaint on or about December 11, 1991, and 
Albertsons filed an Answer on or about December 30, 1991. (R. 2 
and 11). On or about May 5, 1993, Albertsons filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against all causes of action asserted by Chaffin. 
(R. 66). A hearing on Albertson's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
held before the trial court on May 23, 1993, at which time the 
court denied the Motion without prejudice and invited Albertsons to 
renew its Motion for Summary Judgment after the discovery 
completion date of September 30, 1993. (R. 223-234). The trial 
court represented at the hearing that it wanted to give Chaffin 
every opportunity it could to discover "any additional evidence as 
to facts which would demonstrate that this case should go to the 
jury . . . ." (Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 10-11, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "B"; R. 280-
281) . 
After the completion of discovery, Albertsons renewed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment on or about October 8, 1993. (R. 240) . 
A hearing on the Motion was held before the trial court on November 
5, 1993. (R. 243). After reading the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Memoranda in support thereof, and the Memorandum in Opposition 
thereto, and after hearing argument of counsel for both Chaffin and 
Albertsons, the trial court granted Albertsons1 Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. (Order Granting Summary Judgment, attached in Addendum 
as Exhibit "C"; R. 246-248) The Honorable Richard H. Moffat signed 
the Order granting summary judgment and dismissing all causes of 
action against Albertsons on November 15, 1993. (Id.). 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
1. This case arose as the result of an alleged slip and fall 
of Chaffin in a grocery store operated by Albertsons which is 
located in Taylorsville, Utah. (Complaint 5 3-5; R. 2-3). 
2. On or about January 3, 1991, Chaffin entered the subject 
Albertsons store intending to purchase a few grocery items. 
(Deposition of Chaffin at 5, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "D"; 
R. 372) . After selecting a few grocery items in various areas of 
the store, Chaffin was walking along the back aisle of the store 
proceeding east toward the dairy section to pick up a carton of 
milk. (Id. at 12-13, Exhibit "D"; R. 379-380; Chaffin1s Diagram of 
Sales Floor, attached in addendum as Exhibit "E"; R. 455). 
Chaffin was walking in the middle of the aisle next to the meat and 
seafood counter when she saw a floor cleaning machine come out from 
an aisle of groceries ahead of where she was walking. (Deposition 
of Chaffin at 11-17, Exhibit "D"; R. 378-384; Chaffin's Diagram, 
Exhibit "E"; R. 455). Chaffin observed the cleaning machine, with 
its operator, come out from the grocery aisle, circle around the 
end of the display rack, and head down the next aisle over. (Id.) . 
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3. At the same time Chaff in noticed the cleaning machine 
coming out from the aisle, she claims that she slipped and fell to 
the floor (Id.). Chaffin testified that she noticed the cleaning 
machine at the same time both feet went out from underneath her. 
(Id.) Chaffin estimated that the cleaning machine was one aisle of 
groceries ahead of her, approximately 10 feet away, at the time she 
noticed it. (Id.). The fall occurred at approximately 7:05 a.m. 
on the morning of January 3, 1991. (Complaint 5 3; R. 2; Customer 
Slip and Fall Form; R. 102). 
4. Chaffin testified that a wet spot of water on the floor 
caused her to fall. (Deposition of Chaffin at 12-13, Exhibit "D"; 
R. 379-380). Chaffin did not see the wet spot before she fell, but 
claims she noticed it for the first time when she stood up. (Id. 
at 23, Exhibit "D"; R. 390). Chaffin described the wetness as a 
circular spot of water approximately one foot in diameter. (Id. at 
22-23, Exhibit "D"; R. 389-390). Chaffin testified that there was 
no other wetness around that spot and that she didn't notice any 
other wetness in that area on the back aisle. (Id. at 23-24, 
Exhibit "D"; R. 390-391). Chaffin testified that she did not see 
wetness or suds anywhere else on the sales floor on the day of the 
fall. (Id. at 81, Exhibit "D"; R. 448). 
5. Chaffin did not see the cleaning machine clean the area 
of floor where she fell. (Id. at 16, Exhibit "D"; R. 383; Chaffin1 s 
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Diagram, Exhibit "E"; R. 455). Chaffin testified that she didn't 
know how the spot of water which allegedly caused her fall arrived 
on the floor. (Deposition of Chaffin at 25, Exhibit "D"; R. 392). 
She further testified that she did not know how long the spot of 
water had been on the floor before her fall. (Id.). 
6. Allen Morley was the independent custodian who was 
operating the cleaning machine on the morning of January 3, 1991. 
(Deposition of Allen Morley at 7-10, attached in Addendum as 
Exhibit "F"; R. 304-307). Morley owned his own janitorial business 
called Morley Janitorial Service which contracted with Albertsons 
to clean the floor of the Taylorsville store and other Albertsons 
store locations. (Id.). 
7. Allen Morley testified in his deposition that the 
cleaning machine would operate by laying down a water and soap 
solution on the floor and then pads on the machine would scrub the 
solution into the floor. (Id. at 12, Exhibit "F"; R. 309). The 
operator of the cleaning machine would stand behind the machine and 
guide it as it cleaned the floor. (Id. at 13, Exhibit "F"; R. 310). 
Any remaining water and solution would then be removed from the 
floor by a curved squeegee that would swivel and drag on the floor 
under the machine collecting the water or solution and then a 
vacuum would suck up any remaining water and soap from the floor. 
(Id. at 12-17, Exhibit "F"; R. 309-314). 
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8. Allen Morley testified that the cleaning machine was new 
at the time of the slip and fall occurrence. (Id.) . Albertsons had 
purchased the machine in the month of November before the 
occurrence in January, 1991. (Id.). Morley testified that the 
squeegee and vacuum were in excellent working condition at the time 
of the occurrence. (Id.) Allen Morley further testified that, 
after cleaning the floor, the cleaning machine left no spots or 
even traces of water on the floor. (Id.). The squeegee and vacuum 
removed all wetness or solution from the floor after the floor was 
scrubbed. (Id.). 
9. At the time of the accident, Morley was operating the 
cleaning machine and walking down aisle 9 toward the meat and 
seafood departments on the back aisle. (Id. at 24-32, Exhibit "F"; 
R. 321-329; Letter from Allen Morley to Stephen G. Morgan, attached 
in Addendum as Exhibit "G"; R. 361-364; Morley1s Diagram, attached 
in Addendum as Exhibit "H"; R. 365) . As Morley came to the end of 
the aisle, he looked to his right and saw Chaff in two or three 
aisles away in the middle of the back aisle. (Id.). Morley then 
proceeded with the cleaning machine around the end of the display 
case separating aisles 8 and 9, and guided the cleaning machine 
down aisle 8. (Id.). Morley was approximately 1/4 of the distance 
down aisle 8 when he heard a scream. (Id.) . Morley then left the 
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cleaning machine and went back to the back aisle and observed 
Chaffin sitting on the floor in the back aisle. (Id.)* 
10. Morley approached Chaffin and helped her to her feet and 
picked up her groceries. (Id.). Morley estimated that the back 
aisle was approximately 12 to 14 feet wide, and that Chaffin was 
seated in the middle of the aisle a distance of 7 feet from the 
aisles to the north and the same distance from the meat and seafood 
counter to the south. (Id.)» Morley estimated that the cleaning 
machine was approximately 3 feet wide (Id.). 
11. When Allen Morley went to assist Chaffin, he did not see 
any water on the floor in the area where she fell and he did not 
observe any water on her clothing. (Id. at 34-35, Exhibit "F"; R. 
331-332). In addition, Morley testified that he specifically 
remembers guiding the cleaning machine around the display case 
separating aisles 8 and 9 and that the machine did not leave water 
or solution on the floor at that time. (Id.). If the cleaning 
machine did leave water or solution on the floor, Morley would have 
noticed it because he walked behind the cleaning machine to guide 
it. (Id. at 12-17, Exhibit "F"; R. 309-314). 
12. Allen Morley further testified that he normally runs the 
cleaning machine on the outside aisles of the store, including the 
back aisle, before cleaning the inside aisles and that he followed 
this same practice on the morning of the occurrence. (Id. at 44-
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46, Exhibit "F"; R. 341-343). Following this practice, Morley 
testified that he ran the cleaning machine across the spot where 
Chaff in fell 1 hour to 1 1/2 hours before the fall occurred. 
(Id.). 
13. Albertsons' Meat Department Manager, Kurt Treasure, was 
positioned in front of the meat case when he observed Chaffin on 
the floor in the back aisle. (Affidavit of Kurt Treasure f 4-6; R. 
95). After the fall, Treasure immediately went to Chaffin and 
asked if he could help. (Id.). He inspected the floor upon 
arriving at the scene of the alleged fall and observed the floor to 
be completely dry. (Id. 5 7; R. 95). 
14. At the time of the slip and fall occurrence, Kurt 
Treasure's practice, as part of his job as Meat Department Manager, 
was to regularly inspect the floor on the back aisle in front of 
the meat and seafood counter to see that the area was clear of any 
foreign substance. (Id. 5 8, R. 95). Treasure inspected the floor 
in the area of Chaffin1 s alleged fall 10 to 15 minutes before 
seeing Chaffin on the floor and did not observe any water or other 
foreign debris on the floor at that time. (Id. 5 9; R. 95-96). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I.A. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
business owners are not insurers of the safety of their patrons, 
which means that they cannot be held liable for every accident that 
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occurs on their premises. Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1991); Martin v. Safewav Stores. Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 
(Utah 1977) . A business owner only has "a duty to use ordinary 
care and diligence to protect patrons . . . ." Gustaveson v. 
Gregg. 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah appellate courts have not wavered from holding that 
in order to make out a prima facie case of negligence against a 
business owner for an injury caused by a temporary condition, a 
plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence showing that defendant 
had actual or constructive notice of the condition and a reasonable 
opportunity to remedy the condition after having notice. Lindsay 
v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); Silcox v. Skaggs-
Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In the instant case, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that Albertsons had notice of the spot of water on the floor 
allegedly causing Chaffinfs fall or a reasonable opportunity to 
remedy the condition. Therefore, under the applicable law, Chaffin 
failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against 
Albertsons and, therefore, the trial court properly dismissed 
Chaffin's complaint. 
I.B. In advancing her appeal, Chaf fin argues that she need 
not prove notice in order to make out a prima facie case of 
negligence against Albertsons because there is sufficient 
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circumstantial evidence on which a reasonable inference can be made 
by a jury that Albertsons created the dangerous condition. Chaffin 
assumes that because she saw a floor cleaning machine several feet 
ahead of where she was walking at the time of her fall that the 
machine must have left the spot of water on the floor before her 
fall. 
The undisputed evidence is that the floor cleaning machine did 
not leave water or soap on the floor after cleaning the floor. 
Allen Morley, the independent janitor who was operating the 
cleaning machine at the time of the occurrence, testified in his 
deposition that the cleaning machine was new and that the squeegee 
and vacuum system used to clean the soap and water from the floor 
were in excellent working condition. Morley testified that the 
cleaning machine did not leave any spots or traces of water behind 
after cleaning the floor. 
Morley further testified in his deposition that he inspected 
the floor in the area of the fall immediately after it occurred and 
did not see any water or soap solution on the floor. In addition, 
Albertsons1 meat department manager, Kurt Treasure, went to assist 
Chaffin after the fall and inspected the floor where she fell. 
Treasure observed that the floor was completely dry. Treasure also 
inspected the floor in the area where Chaffin fell 10 to 15 minutes 
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before the fall and observed the floor at that time to be free from 
wetness. 
The evidence further shows that Morley ran the floor cleaning 
machine across the spot where Chaffin fell 1 to 1 1/2 hours before 
the fall occurred. Chaffin herself testified that she did not see 
the floor cleaning machine clean the spot where she fell. Chaffin 
further testified that she did not know how the water arrived on 
the floor or how long it had been there before her fall. 
Consequently, Chaffin1s only evidence that Albertsons was 
responsible for the condition on the floor is her deposition 
testimony that she saw a cleaning machine several feet away from 
her at the time she fell and that she observed a wet spot on the 
floor after getting up from her fall. Based on the evidence in the 
record, a reasonable inference cannot be made that Albertsons 
created the condition which allegedly caused Chaffin1s fall. 
The law provides that a plaintiff is entitled to reasonable 
and fair inferences which tend to prove her case. Koer v. Mavfair 
Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) . A plaintiff cannot make out his 
or her case through conjectural or speculative assertions that lack 
an evidentiary foundation. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1985); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co. , 239 Utah Adv. R. 57 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) . Chaffin1s allegations that the floor cleaning machine 
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deposited the water on the floor are based on conjecture and are 
without a proper evidentiary foundation. The trial court 
appropriately found that there was insufficient evidence for the 
jury to draw an inference that the cleaning machine left the water 
on the floor and that it could not permit the jury to speculate. 
Chaff in described the spot of water which allegedly caused her 
to fall as circular and one foot in diameter. Chaff in further 
testified that there was no other wetness around that spot of water 
and that she didn't notice water spots anywhere else in the store 
that day. If in fact there was water on the floor as Chaff in 
alleges, the water could have arrived on the floor by numerous 
possible means without notice to Albertsons. Chaffin herself 
testified that she did not know how the water arrived on the floor 
or how long it had been there before her fall. The trial court 
properly granted summary judgment; otherwise, a jury would be left 
to impermissibly speculate as to the cause of the water on the 
floor. 
Chaffin has failed to satisfy her burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence showing that Albertson created the condition or 
that it had notice of its presence. Accordingly, the trial court 
appropriately dismissed Chaffin1s complaint against Albertsons. 
II. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that summary judgment is appropriate if a party fails to set forth 
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue remaining for 
trial. Appellate Courts hold that in order to survive a motion for 
summary judgment, the defending party must present sufficient 
evidence on which a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The mere 
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's 
position will be insufficient. Id. If the non-moving party cannot 
muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on 
his or her claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. 
Albertsons supported its Motion for Summary Judgment with 
undisputed facts from the record that it did not create the alleged 
condition supposedly causing Chaffin's fall and that it did not 
have notice of any condition. Chaffin opposed Albertsons' Motion 
by citing to Chaffin's deposition testimony that she observed a 
floor cleaning machine before she fell and a spot of water on the 
floor. This evidence is simply inadequate to overcome Albertsons' 
Motion under Rule 56(e). A fair minded jury could not find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Chaffin is entitled to a verdict 
against Albertsons. Application of this standard to the instant 
case shows that the trial court appropriately granted summary 
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judgment In favor of Albertsons and its order should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
CHAITJM FAILS TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
DEMONSTRATING THAT ALBERTSONS CREATED THE 
CONDITION ALLEGEDLY CAUSING HER FALL; 
THEREFORE, CHAFFIN MUST SHOW THAT ALBERTSONS 
HAD NOTICE OF THE SUBSTANCE AND A REASONABLE 
OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY THE CONDITION 
Chaffin must prove that Albertsons had notice of the condition 
and a reasonable opportunity to remedy i t i n order t~ - ? * - • — " * • 
a prima facie case of negligence 
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Jewelers
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condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery, wet substance 
on the floor, two conditions must be satisfied: "(A) that he had 
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or 
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long 
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such 
knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have remedied it." Lindsay v. Eccles 
Hotel Co,. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955); Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 
P.2d 566 (Utah 1967); Howard v. Auerbach Co,. 437 P.2d 895 (Utah 
1968); Long v. Smiths Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973); 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P. 2d 175 (Utah 1975); 
Martin, 565 P.2d 1139; Peats v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 746 P.2d 1191 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Silcox v. Skaggs-Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 P.2d 
623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d 
1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The plaintiff has the burden of presenting evidence showing 
that the above prerequisites are satisfied in order to make out a 
prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. Id. Utah 
appellate courts have upheld the trial courts' granting of summary 
judgment motions and motions for directed verdicts on numerous 
occasions where plaintiff fails to produce adequate evidence 
proving notice and a reasonable opportunity to remedy. Id. 
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li: 1 the instant case:*, the record i s devoi d of any evidence 
floor supposedly causing Chaffin's fall or a reasonable opportunity 
t :: • J : emedy the cond :i ti 01 :i Therefore, under the applicable law, 
Chaffin failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against 
A ] bertsons and the trial court properly ruled that her complaint 
shoi ill! d 1: = :::i :ii sm i ss ad a ,,s a ma t tiei: o f ,3! e ,i i , 
Chaffin failed to present sufficient evidence that Albertsons 
created the condition allegedly causing her fall 
In bringing this appeal, Chaf fin arqiies that she need not 
prove the notice requirements in order to makes, out a prima facie. 
casi i i I in 11 I mi i J i»™ it r i> in jd i mi1.1 I'llbei't lulls 1 u MI HIM.' I limi'ii i i " idi'iire 
t li.it A l b e r t s o n s c r e a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t c a u s e d t h e a c c i d e n t , 
I m|,
 x e £ Q £ A p p e l l a n t at 1 h) . A s |»r cvions.1 y d i s c u s s e d , the general 
rule is thai a pla J ntil 1 must pi induce r»v JileJice t:l la t the busli less 
owner had notice of the dangerous condition i i :i order to submit the 
case I i i | II in ',' il I I in i mention ef negligence. The exception to 
I In i, general ink" u» that a plaintiil need not prove not Lee ot the 
i "niid Ltion if ii was created by the* business ownc , M III'III 
i } '1(| r,:M; LyjKh "" 'l i i" «1l,i ' '• 
If a plaintiff is attempting to avrti'^ +"*e notice, requirements 
by arguing that the store, owner was responsible for the dangerous 
cond ii t:::i DI it, p] a ii i it ti f111: 1 las I In I mnliMi I | w n d n c i i ig si iffi ci ent 
evidence showing that the business owner created the condition. 
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Id, A plaintiff is entitled to all "reasonable" and "fair" 
inferences which tend to prove plaintiff's case. Mavfair Markets, 
431 P. 2d 566; Allen, 538 P. 2d 175. A plaintiff is not entitled to 
inferences based on conjecture which are not supported by evidence 
in the record. Id.1 A jury is not permitted to speculate that the 
defendant is negligent. Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566; Lindsay, 
284 P.2d 477; Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 
1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "bare allegations of 
negligence unsupported by any facts are not sufficient to withstand 
a motion for summary judgment." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 
(Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court further held: "The mere 
assertion that an issue of facts exists without a proper 
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to 
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion." Webster v. 
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) .2 
1See Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 238 Utah Adv. R. 57, 58 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (to meet their burden of proof, the plaintiffs 
must provide sufficient evidence raising a reasonable inference 
from which the jury may rationally determine that plaintiff's 
injuries resulted from the product's defect. "It is not enough to 
merely contend that a defect existed, show that an accident 
occurred, and assume the two are necessarily related."). 
2See Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989)(,nbare contentions, unsupported by any specification 
of facts in support thereof, raise no material questions of fact as 
will preclude entry of summary judgment.'")(quoting Massev v. Utah 
Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980)). 
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Chaf f:i n e xg i les :i :i: i t::l:i:i s appeal that there is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence on which a reasonable inference can be made 
by a jury that the floor cleaning machi ne deposited the spot of 
ot Appellant at 6-1 6) . Contrary to Chaf fin's contentions, the 
record of this case shows that Chaff i n's allegations are 
. • :ii * Ei: a i id ar = it 10 t si lppor t e d 1: y e\ i dei IC =s :ii i 1 t:l: l e r • s c o r d . 
I I mi in in a r g u e s t h a t one nil tl le f a c t s which c r e a t e s an 
i nf e r e n c e t h a t t h e c l e a n i nq machi ne ] e f t a s p o t of wa t e r 01 :i t h e 
J i it i i . I i in i Mill 11 i . HI j machi i le i l sed a soap ai id wa t e r 
s o l u t i o n in t h e c l e a n i n g p r o c o n c , ( B r i e f of A p p e l l a n t a t 1 0 - 1 2 ) . 
All III in Moriey a i s t h e independen t c u s t o d i a n who was o p e r a t i n g t h e 
c l e a n i n g man Mine a t t h e I. Line ui t h e s i i p and f a l l o c c u r r e n c e . 
I llii ||iii ; I t i o n i t A l i en Moriey a t 7 -10 , E x h i b i t " F " ; R 30 1 307) . 
Il I ill IN! 11 I i'V ill i ill 1 ill | n il t <>st i if"^| I In it, t tl ie i ::il eai :i i i i ::j mach i i le o p e r a tied 
lb), laying down a watei and soap solution oi i the f] oor which would 
be scrubbed into the floor by pad,*..; on the cleaning machine. (Id. 
in II II II Hi in H i in II II " II M*I in i  d a f I : i i: I fa ii ] s !:: :> p o i i l t: • :: i i t j 1 I :> w e v e r , 
the undisputed evidence in the record that the cleaning machine did 
not leave any spots or traces of water behind after cleaning ai i 
a i L M I n i l II II 1 II i | i l l i l l II II III" x : l : ii I >. ii I '111? '•., " I Ii: 2 : 9 3 1 1 I ) 1 1 1 • 
Moriey testified as follows starting on page 12 of his deposition: 
IJ in understand that you, operated a cleaning 
machine as part of your duties; i s that correct? 
19 
A. Yes. 
Q. Could you describe that cleaning machine? 
A. Big, awkward and green. Held water and soap solution 
in a tank, you would lay it down, pads would scrub the floor 
and the vacuum would pick all the water back up. 
Q. Tell me, was the soap and water then picked up from 
off the floor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How? 
A. There's a squeegee that drags behind you. 
Q. Drags behind what? 
A. Behind the machine, and there's a vacuum that's 
picking it up as the machine is operating, cleaning the floor. 
A. It was a brand new machine. It picked up all the 
water off the floor. That's all it took. 
Q. Did this machine that was used in the Taylorsville 
store that you operated, did it leave these stripes you're 
talking about? 
A. It left none. 
Q. It left no water at all? 
A. No. 
Q. During the time that you operated that machine you 
did not observe that machine to leave water on the floor? 
A. No 
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'if,), s o w h e i i y ou would take the machine around corners, 
when you had to turn the machine, would i t leave water 01 1 
those occasions? 
ft N :::> I .i ke I r i sntioned, the squeegee is Independent 
and it would swivel and tin ack you, so I t won] d pick up all the 
water. 
0,, IIJ ±1 xL liLti.1 l e t t any w a t e r would yo;u n o t i c e i t on 
t h e f l o o r ? 
A. Oh, y e s , d e f i n i t e l y . 
( i d . ) . 
Tn addition, Albertsons's meat department mmiqnr Kurt 
Treasure,, was on the scene of Chaffin's alleged fall immediately 
11 I i I I I i > r i. M M i i II il in I II i i l l in ' I II i i II II ill I I I I ' l O i l b i n ( II i n II I II i" II . 
l i i v i s i i r e i n s p e c t e d t h e f l o o r upon a r r i v i n g a t t h e s c e n e o t t h e 
a l l e g e d f i l l and o b s e r v e d i t t o be c o m p l e t e l y dr i i I  i I || I L . 
"U J ) ' . K u r t T r e a s u r e a l s o i n s p e c t e d I he I luui in I liu aie«i whure 
Chaff In a l l e g e d l y f e l l ] 0 to 15 m i n u t e s b e f o r e 1*he I i I I niniiit 
• • ' • - . _ , . ! i 8 -
"'J» ; III-" 9 5-96) . 
Morley further testified in his deposition that he inspected 
I I in in i i ii 111 I l i u II in II II in in in c d i r i I o I y 11 I i > i in II i in i "i e 
any w a t e r on t h e i t loor ( D e p o s i t i o n ol A l l e n Morley ^ .
 m - . d 
D>, E x h i b i t " F " f I l ' / r Ml .iiull l1,1) He a l s o s p e c i f i c a l l y 
r e m e m I K . M • < M I 1 • 11 11 I I n * i In . \ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 11 I  i 111 I 11II 11 I I i i . i 111 \ '' -11 c i 1111 I I  i a 
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floor when it was cleaning the aisles at the time of Chaffin's 
fall: 
Q. At the time when the cleaning machine rounded the 
freezer aisle did you see whether or not it had left any water 
or soap on the floor? 
A. None. 
Q. It did not leave any water or soap on the floor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you specifically remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know of any other reason why any water or soap 
or anything of that sort would have been on the floor in the 
area where she fell? 
A. To the best of my knowledge, there was nothing there, 
the floor was dry. 
(Id. at 35, Exhibit "F", R. 332). 
Although the evidence does show that the cleaning machine used 
a soap and water solution, the evidence is clear that the machine 
did not leave water or any solution on the floor in the area of the 
fall. Chaff in admitted in her deposition that at no time before 
her fall did she see the cleaning machine clean the area of floor 
where she fell. (Deposition of Chaffin at 10-11 and 16, Exhibit 
"D"; R. 377, 378 and 383). Chaffin further admitted in her 
deposition that she had no knowledge as to how the wetness which 
allegedly caused her fall arrived on the floor or for what period 
of time it had been there prior to her alleged fall: 
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U, Do ^ ou know I m« tlie water, the spot of water which 
you mentioned, i it used your fa IJ , do you know how It arrived on 
the floor? 
A I I ! I 
MI IN it you have personal knowledge as to how long it had 
been on the floor before your tall? 
k I I 
( I d . a t ? 5 , |< w (i i | , | t "TV1- F *>5) 
< li ill I in f u r t he r argues t h a t the cour t should have found from 
Z I M Ml i ill III I II lil I II II I I I I | I I I I I I I I I III II 111111 ' | M i l , 1 .( 'I I i i»Vi II I II HI II I 11 M l I ii l 
n
 II in11;; ldJJ immediately bet ore the tail occurred, and that 
is another fact creating an inference Hint the cleaning machine 
1 * L I l i e s p i l l 1 1 1 i i ' i in II I  mi i n in in II In Il II mi i II I ii* i (, II m l A p | ) » - » 1 I - i n in I i l l ' II H I ) . 
a aga in , t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s merely con jec tu re and rial supported 
by i proper e v i d e n t i a r y foundation As p rev ious ly mnntioiir d, 
d ia l t in ddnultud in hi i tlupoui [ 11 uj 1 hall whv iLid noil -j.ee I he-
c l e a n i n g machine pass by the spot where she f e l l : 
le t me ask you t o p l ace an X a t t h e exac t 
l o c a t i o n when' you f e l l . 
A. Right . • . . 
Q You d idn't see the cleaning machine, though, until it 
was approximately six to ten feet from where you were? 
I , Right. 
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Q. You did not actually see it go over that spot? 
A. No, 
(Deposition of Chaffin at 10-11 and 16, Exhibit "D"; R. 377, 378 
and 383; Chaffin's Diagram, Exhibit "E"; R. 455). 
Chaffin testified that she was walking down the middle of the 
back aisle of the store before the fall occurred. (Deposition of 
Chaffin at 11, Exhibit "D"; R. 378; Chaffin1s Diagram, Exhibit "E"; 
R. 455). Allen Morley testified consistent with Chaffin when he 
said that she was located in the middle of the back aisle when he 
saw her on the floor. (Deposition of Allen Morley at 24-32, 
Exhibit "F"; R. 321-329; Morley Diagram, Exhibit "H"; R. 365). 
Morley estimated that the back aisle was 12 to 14 feet wide and 
that Chaffin was positioned a distance of 7 feet from the meat and 
seafood counter on the south and the same distance from the grocery 
aisles on the north. (Id.). 
Morley testified that he normally runs the cleaning machine on 
the outside aisles of the store, including the back aisle, before 
cleaning the inside aisles and that he followed this same practice 
on the morning of the occurrence. (Id. at 44-46, Exhibit "F"; R. 
341-343). Following this practice, Morley testified that he ran 
the cleaning machine across the spot where Chaffin fell 1 to 1 1/2 
hours before the fall occurred. (Id.). 
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Contrary to Chaffin's assertions, the direct evidence of this 
case is that the location where Chaffin fell was not cleaned 
immediately before her fall. Chaffin did not see the machine clean 
the spot where she fell and any assertions by her that the cleaning 
machine cleaned that spot just before the fall are speculative and 
not based on the evidence. 
Chaffin further argues in her brief that the wetness on the 
floor was one similar to that encountered after mopping a floor, 
and that this is another fact creating an inference that the 
cleaning machine caused the water to be on the floor. (Brief of 
Appellant at 10-12). When asked in her deposition to describe the 
wetness on the floor, Chaffin initially testified that there were 
little spots all over the floor. (Deposition of Chaffin at 22, 
Exhibit "D"; R. 389). When pressed on the question, however, 
Chaffin admitted that there was just one circular spot on the floor 
approximately 1 foot in diameter. (Id. at 22-23, Exhibit "D"; R. 
389-390). Chaffin then testified that there was no other wetness 
around that spot of water and that she didn't notice any other 
wetness in that area on the back aisle. (Id. 23-24, Exhibit "D"; 
R. 390-391). Chaffin further testified that she did not see any 
other wetness or suds on the floor anywhere else in the store that 
day. (Id. at 81, Exhibit "D"; R. 448). 
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As previously mentioned, Kurt Treasure, the Meat Department 
Manager, inspected the back aisle and did not see any water on the 
floor in the back aisle at the time of the fall. (Affidavit of 
Kurt Treasure f 7-9; R. 95-96). In addition, Morley himself did 
not see any water on the back aisle at the time of the fall. 
(Deposition of Allen Morley at 34-35, Exhibit "F"; R. 331-332). 
The spot of water on the floor described by Chaffin is not 
exclusively descriptive of water that is caused by mopping. The 
spot of moisture described by Chaffin (circular and 1 foot in 
diameter) could come from any number of possible sources including 
a customer spilling water, soda pop, another product, or even 
moisture coming from the shoe of a customer. Speculation as to the 
source of the wetness is, however, impermissible, and is 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) 
Based on the record of this case, a reasonable inference 
cannot be made that Albertsons created the condition which 
allegedly caused Chaffin1s fall. Chaffin1s only evidence that 
Albertsons was responsible for the wetness on the floor is her 
assertion that she saw a cleaning machine one grocery aisle away 
from her at the time she fell and that there was a spot of water on 
the floor. Chaffin has no other evidence linking Albertsons to the 
presence of the wetness on the floor. As the Utah Supreme Court 
26 
stated: "such a tenuous inference is not one which a jury can be 
allowed to make." Mayfair Markets. 431 P.2d at 569. This is 
especially true when considering the undisputed evidence that the 
cleaning machine did not cause the wetness to be on the floor and 
there was no other wetness anywhere else in the store. 
In arriving at its decision to grant Albertsons' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the trial court appropriately found that there 
was insufficient evidence for the jury to draw an inference that 
the cleaning machine left the water on the floor and that it could 
not permit the jury to speculate: 
THE COURT: Well, the only—the only basis on which 
you could make that decision or that a jury could make 
that decision would be the inference that when it went 
over it an hour earlier, it left it wet enough that it 
remained wet, wet enough for an hour, that when the 
plaintiff fell, it was still wet; but when she got up and 
walked to the front of the store and got back, it had 
dried out. 
I think, Mr. Hadley, that is really stretching that 
testimony. I think the motion for summary judgment's 
well taken. I'm going to grant it. 
THE COURT: . . . . I think there's got to be a 
closer tie than an hour from a machine that has been 
testified wipes it dry as it cleans it up. And the 
condition that your client described would almost infer 
that the mop, had it been a mop situation, had just gone 
across that. And there's no evidence anywhere, anywhere, 
that that bucket and mop had ever been used on that aisle 
that evening. There isn't any evidence anywhere about 
that. 
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So, all you can worry about—or—or the only thing 
you can be concerned about, I think, as far as the 
evidence is concerned, is—is the machine. And I just 
think that that's speculation and that leap is too far. 
I don't think the jury can be allowed to do that. 
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment at 23-25, 
Exhibit "B"; R. 293-295). 
Chaffin cites Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P. 2d 623, 
in support of her position. The plaintiff in Silcox brought action 
against the defendant grocery store for injuries sustained when she 
slipped on the sales floor of defendant's store. The record of the 
case showed that the floor was wet where plaintiff fell and spots 
of water were found leading to a cart with bags of ice that were 
continuing to melt to the floor. Id. at 624. The record further 
showed that the cart was of the type that was only used by store 
employees. Id. 
Based on the evidence that there was water on the floor, and 
water spots leading to bags of melting ice on a cart only used by 
store employees, the court in Silcox determined that a reasonable 
inference could be made by the jury that the store created the 
condition. Id. at 624-25. The facts of Silcox are far removed 
from those of the instant case where Chaffin's only evidence that 
Albertsons created the wetness on the floor is that before she fell 
she observed a cleaning machine several feet away from her and a 
spot of water after she fell. There were no trails of water 
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leading to the cleaning machine and there is no evidence that the 
cleaning machine left water on the floor. 
The facts here are much more closely aligned with Lindsay v. 
Eccles Hotel Company. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955). In Lindsay, the 
plaintiff brought action against the defendant after she slipped on 
a puddle of water that was on the floor of defendant's coffee shop. 
The Utah Supreme Court was unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that 
because the waitress delivered water to plaintiff in a glass, a 
reasonable inference could be made that the waitress spilled the 
water on the floor. The Court stated: 
There is no evidence as to whether the waitress, the 
plaintiff, her companion, or other patrons or persons 
spilled the water on the floor, or exactly when it was 
spilled or whether the management knew of its existence. 
In other words, there was no evidence as to how the water 
got onto the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly 
when it arrived there or that the defendant had knowledge 
of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury cannot 
be permitted to speculate that the defendant was negli-
gent. 
Id. at 478. 
The evidence for finding in favor of Albertsons is as 
compelling in this case as in Lindsay. Chaffin has shown no 
evidence linking Albertsons to the presence of the water on the 
floor other than her observing a floor cleaning machine and a spot 
of water. The evidence which Chaffin did not refute is that the 
floor cleaning machine did not leave any water behind. If in fact 
there was water on the floor as Chaffin alleges, the water could 
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have arrived on the floor in several possible ways. As the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated in Silcox; 
The mere presence of a slippery spot on a floor does 
not in and of itself establish negligence. This condi-
tion may arise in any place of business for any number 
reasons. Proof that a slippery or wet substance was on 
a floor, does not, without more, establish that defendant 
knew or should have known of the condition. 
Silcox, 814 P.2d at 624. 
As in Lindsay, Chaffin has failed to satisfy her burden as to 
how the water got onto the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly 
when it arrived there, or that the Albertsons had knowledge of its 
presence. This evidence is insufficient for any jury to reasonably 
infer that Albertsons created the condition. A jury would engage 
in mere speculation if allowed to determine whether Albertsons was 
responsible for the water on the floor. Accordingly, Chaffin must 
show that Albertsons had notice of the condition and a reasonable 
opportunity to remove it. This Chaffin has failed to do, and, 
therefore, her claims were properly dismissed by the trial court 
and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATELY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 
ALBERTSONS IN LIGHT OF THE STANDARDS FOR DECIDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 
judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions 
establish there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and 
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that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). Subsection (e) of Rule 56 further 
provides that in opposing a motion, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affida-
vits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Id. 
The United States Supreme Court set forth the following with 
respect to the granting of summary judgment motions: 
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves 
for summary judgment . . . based on the lack of proof of 
a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether 
he thinks the evidence unmistakenly favors one side or 
the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a 
verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The 
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of 
the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must 
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for 
the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoid-
ably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a verdict . . . . 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc. . 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see 
Mavfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566 (directed verdict is appropriate in 
negligence cases where there is an "absence of any substantial 
evidence to support the verdict."); Mitchell. 697 P.2d 240 (Summary 
judgment was appropriate because plaintiff failed in his burden to 
show "that defendants' conduct was a substantial causative factor 
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that led to Mitchell's death."). If the non-moving party cannot 
muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable issue of fact on 
his claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 
U.S. 242. 
Application of this standard to the instant case shows that 
the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of 
Albertsons. Albertsons has supported its motion for summary 
judgment with undisputed evidence that it did not have notice, 
either actual or constructive, of the condition on the floor of 
which Chaffin complains and that it did not create the condition. 
Chaffin opposes the evidence presented by Albertsons by merely 
citing to Chaffin1s deposition testimony that she observed a floor 
cleaning machine before she fell and that there was a spot of water 
on the floor. This evidence is simply inadequate to overcome 
Albertsons's motion. A reasonable and fair-minded jury could not 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that Chaffin is entitled to 
a verdict against Albertsons. 
Under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Chaffin1s response does not satisfy her burden of showing that 
there is a genuine issue of a material fact remaining for trial. 
Requiring Albertsons to prepare for and defend at trial would be a 
gross waste of time and expense. The trial court did not err in 
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granting Albertsons' Motion for Summary Judgment and its Order 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant and Appellee, 
Albertsons, Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial 
court granting Albertsons1 Motion for Summary Judgment be affirmed, 
the appeal of Chaffin be dismissed, and Albertsons be awarded its 
costs on appeal. 
DATED this 8 /< day of 
"7 X. 
1994. 
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Albertsons, Inc. 
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